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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee

)
)
)

vs

)

JAMES WESTON DECKER,

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Court of Appeals
Case No. 990029-CA

DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff-Appellee WEST VALLEY CITY is a Utah
municipal corporation. [Although the caption of the
Information is entitled "STATE OF UTAH (West Valley
City) v. JAMES WESTON DECKER", it is assumed that the
West

Valley

City

Attorney

(or

his

authorized

assistants) have filed and prosecuted this case, as a
violation of state statute, as authorized by Section
10-3-928, Utah Code.]
The Defendant-Appellant JAMES WESTON DECKER is a
natural person, was charged and convicted of two
misdemeanor offenses, in a bench trial in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to
the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal and the predicate factual and legal
situation in which is arose presents the following
issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing
to require a bill of particulars to afford the
accused reasonable notice of the specific
offense(s) with which he was charged, because
the filed Information was so lacking as to
apprise the Defendant and the Court of the
precise nature of the charge and the specific
misconduct
related
to
that
charge.
[Defendant's REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS

filed with the trial court in the RECORD at
pages 12-13.]
2. Whether the Information itself actually
charges a public offense and/or whether the
evidence
adduced
at
trial
actually
establishes, by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Defendant's guilt of such "charged"
offense. [Defendant's "Motion to Arrest
Judgment" filed with the trial court. RECORD
at pages 54-57.]
3 . Whether the Court erred in denying the
Defendant his right to trial by jury, when a
written demand was timely filed and served,
because the Defendant failed to "reconfirm"
his demand therefor. [Defendant's "Motion to
Arrest Judgment" filed with the trial court.
RECORD at pages 54-57.]
4. Whether the provisions of Section 76-1402(3)(b), Utah Code [pertaining to and
defining
"single criminal episode" and
"attempt" situations] preclude the conviction
of both "theft" offenses, one of which was

charged as "attempt". [Defendant's "Motion to
Arrest Judgment" filed with the trial court.
RECORD at pages 54-57.]
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal
cases are reviewed for correctness. This standard of
review has also been referred to as a "correction of
error standard". The "correction of error" standard
means that the appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial
judge's determination of law. State vs Deli, 861 P.2d
431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993).Whether the trial
court properly interpreted (or applied) a statute is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. State vs
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah Supreme Court 1993);
State vs James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah Supreme Court
1991); State vs Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah
Supreme Court 1991); State vs Shipler, 869 P.2d 968,
969 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994); State vs Simmons, 866
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993); Salt Lake
City vs Emerson, 861 P. 2d 443, 445

(Utah Court of

Appeals 1993); State vs Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001,
1002 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993); State vs Paul, 860
P.2d 992, 993 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993).
An

error

in

a

criminal

prosecution

requires

reversal when the appellate court concludes that,
absent the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of

a result more favorable to the accused. State vs
Knight, 734 P.2d 913

(Utah Supreme Court 1987). In

certain circumstances the nature of the error involved
is such that the burden of convincing the appellate
court that the error was "harmless" (i.e. that the
error did not "unfairly prejudice the defense") shifts
to the prosecution. Knight, supra; State vs Bell, 770
P. 2d 100 (Utah Supreme Court 1988) . In cases where the
prosecution fails to convince the appellate court of
the "harmless" status of the error, remand of the case
is proper. Bell, supra.
The trial court has primary responsibility for
making determinations of fact. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d
932 (Utah Supreme Court 1994). A trial court's findings
of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under a
"clearly erroneous standard". State vs Goodman, 763
P. 2d 786 (Utah Supreme Court 1988) . See also Rule 52 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3 0 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. A trial court's
finding as to a factual issue is.clearly erroneous when
it is against the clear weight of the evidence or,
although there is evidence to support it, the appellate
court reviewing all the record evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Pena, supra.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following provisions may be determinative of
the issues raised in this appeal:
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution
[jury trial and bill of particulars issues]
Section 7 6-4-101, Utah Code ["attempt" defined]
Section 76-4-201(3) (b), Utah Code [pertaining
to "single criminal episode" and "attempt"]
Section 76-1-402, Utah Code [pertaining to
"single criminal episode"]
Section 76-6-405, Utah Code [pertaining to
"theft by deception"]
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
[pertaining to "bill of particulars"]
Rule 17(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
[Jury Trial]
The complete text of these provisions are contained in
the ADDENDA, at the end of this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appeal of this case involves issues pertaining
to three distinct "sets" of facts.
Facts pertaining to alleged underlying criminal
offense
On

27

February

1998

the

Defendant-

Appellant JAMES W DECKER went to the West
Valley City Hall and made a request to inspect
certain "public records" pertaining to certain
real estate parcels, against which West Valley

City [hereinafter "the City"] had initiated
"code enforcement" actions. The public records
were the two "case files" of the two "cases",
contained in manila file folders. Candace
Gleed,

Hearings

Coordinator

of

the

Administrative Code Enforcement program of the
City, voluntarily surrendered one of the files
to Mr Decker and allowed him to inspect the
same

a single file

in the office foyer of

the public office. [TRANSCRIPT at Page 57.]
Ms Gleed

testified

at trial

that Mr

Decker placed the files on the table, examined
the documents contained in the files, and
removed some of the documents from the file
folder. Ms Gleed and another City employee
continued to observe Mr Decker. She (Ms Gleed)
testified that she observed him (Decker) place
color photographs

(snapshots) between two

"telephone books" which were on the table at
which Mr Decker was sitting to inspect the
public records. [TRANSCRIPT at pages 56-63.]
Per Ms Gleed's testimony, Mr Decker was
observed to reassemble the case file; he
thereafter returned the file to Ms Gleed.
After informing her that he was going to the

City Treasurer' s office to pay for photocopies
of the very records he had just inspected, he
then left the room. [The citizen's right to
inspect

and

expressly

copy governmental

controlled

and

records is

authorized

by

statute, including but not limited to Section
10-3-603 and 63-2-201, Utah Code.] Mr Decker
paid for the copies and returned to the foyer
of the Code Enforcement office. [TRANSCRIPT
at Page 62.]
During

his

unbeknownst

to

absence, Ms Gleed
Mr

Decker

had

retrieved

the

photographs Mr Decker allegedly placed in
between the "telephone books" and resecured
them to the official City file. [TRANSCRIPT at
Page 64, line 24.]
From the office foyer table Mr Decker
then removed two of telephone books. The
"telephone books" here at issue are the public
telephone

books

distributed
Company,

by

prepared,

printed

Construction

Incorporated, without

and

Directories
charge, to

telephone customers and other members of the
public. The suppliers of the telephone books
generally provide large quantities of the

telephone

books

(governmental

to

offices,

public
public

offices
libraries,

utilities offices, etc.) and other "public"
places, for FREE DISTRIBUTION to members of
the public: the telephone books are "FREE FOR
THE TAKING!" The telephone books in question
were stacked in large quantities in the foyer
and were for "free public distribution", as is
customarily the practice by the suppliers of
the telephone books. [See RECORD at page 65.]
Mr

Decker,

telephone

seeing
books

the
there

large

quantity

displayed

of

under

circumstances with which he was familiar, took
two telephone books, in plain view to the City
employees and other persons in the foyer area.
Neither

Ms Gleed nor the other City

employees who were with her in the foyer
testified they had observed him remove the
telephone books. [That he took the telephone
books

was

admitted

by Mr

Decker,

during

presentation of the defense portion of the
case, but only after a motion
termination
chief

made at the

of the prosecution's

case-in-

to dismiss for failure to prove the

charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.]

[TRANSCRIPT at Pages 87-89.]
Mr Decker was subsequently charged

in

a very vague and ambiguous charging document--with two offenses: {D theft by deception;
and

(2)

document

attempted
did

not

theft.

[The

charging

identify

the

specific

property to be taken or even the owner of such
property for each charged offense; the charge
merely recited the Utah statute.] The case was
prosecuted by attorneys from the West Valley
City Attorney's Office.
Defendant's Request for Bill of Particulars
Because the filed Information was so
vague and ambiguous and lacking in factual
descriptions

critical

to

the

Defendant's

preparation of his defense, the Defendant made
repeated requests for a "bill of particulars".
The Prosecuting Attorneys consistently refused
to provide the same. Eventually, the trial
judge

reversed

her

earlier

decision

and

refused to order a "bill of particulars". That
the prosecution was allowed to proceed on the
vague and ambiguous Information
not

correlate

specific charge

specific

property

which did
to

the

was to have serious adverse

impact

upon

Defendant

the

was

Defendant.

improperly

First,

placed

at

the
a

disadvantage because he did not know which
charge corresponded to which property (i.e.
photographs or telephone books). Obviously,
the City Prosecutors thought there were TWO
distinct offenses, because two offenses were
charged! Secondly, the two charges were so
ambiguous and vague that the trial judge
actually found the defendant guilty of the two
offenses,

exactly

opposite

of

what

the

prosecutors had intended. [The trial judge's
view of the disputed evidence is contained in
her statements made at the 14 December 1998
sentencing hearing.]
Defendant's request for trial by jury
In August 1998 the trial court
request of the parties

at the

scheduled the trial

for "jury trial" on 4 November 1998.
In September 1998 the,Defendant filed a
timely, written demand for jury trial. A copy
thereof

was

served

upon

the

prosecuting

attorney. [RECORD at 18. ADDENDUM #4.]
In November

two months later

the case

was scheduled for "jury trial". The Court's

own "docket sheet" for the date of trial
November 4th

clearly indicates the case was

scheduled for "jury trial". [See ADDENDUM #5.
See also the computerized "docket history"
showing the case is scheduled for jury trial.
ADDENDUM #6]
On the morning of the trial, Judge Boyden
refused to convene a jury. She claimed to have
found

that

the

Defendant

had

not

"re-

confirmed" with the Clerk of the Court his
earlier demand for jury trial.
At

no

time

did

the

Defendant

ever

withdraw his demand for a jury trial or agree
to be tried by the judge alone.
The case proceeded as a bench trial, at
which the Defendant was found guilty of both
charged offenses.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant's arguments in this appeal are summarized
as follows:
1.

The Defendant was prejudiced by the trial

court's failure to order a bill of particulars
so as to enable him to adequately prepare his
defense. The pre-trial disclosure

(via the

prosecutor's "open files" actually misled the

Defendant as to the theory upon which the
prosecutor was relying. The trial court's
confusion as to what the evidence actually
proved

(and/or how the statute was to be

applied)

made

this

critical.

Utah

case

failure
law

absolutely

shifts

to

the

prosecutor the burden of showing that the
error was harmless.
2.

The Information itself fails to actually

state

the

charged

offense.

The

evidence

adduced at trial is lacking as to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused's guilt
of the charged offense.
3.

The trial court erred in denying the

Defendant his right to trial by jury, when a
written demand was timely filed and served,
merely

because

the

Defendant

failed

to

"reconfirm" his demand therefor.
4.

The provisions of Section 76-1-402 (3) (b),

Utah Code [pertaining to and defining "single
criminal episode" and "attempt" situations]
preclude

the

offenses,

one

conviction
of

which

of

both

was

"theft"

charged

as

"attempt".
5.

The

prosecution-called

witness

affirmatively stated there was "no deception"
on

her

part

in

allowing

the

Defendant

temporary custody of the public records. The
evidence does not support the verdicts. The
trial court judge found the evidence "exactlybackwards" from what the prosecution set out
to prove

(and still believes what it did

prove).
ARGUMENT
I
THE DEFENDANT WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED BY THE
TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THE
FILING OF A BILL OF PARTICULARS TO APPRISE THE
DEFENDANT OF THE REASONABLE NOTICE OF THE
CHARGED OFFENSES, TO ENABLE HIM TO PREPARE A
DEFENSE TO THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provides in relevant part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, . . .
Emphasis added.
These

constitutional

provisions

are

further

implemented by Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
[The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure now supersede the
previous

"Rules", adopted

by

the Legislature

and

formerly codified at 77-35-1 et seq, which statutory
provisions were repealed in 1989]. Rule 4 provides, in

relevant part:
(b) An indictment or information shall charge
the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the
offense by common law or by statute or by
stating in concise terms the definition of the
offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. An information may
contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to
sustain the offense charged where appropriate.
Such things as time, place, means, intent,
manner, value and ownership need not be
alleged, unless necessary to charge the
offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and
judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known
or by which they be identified without setting
forth a copy. However, details concerning such
things may be obtained through a bill of
particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor
matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(e) When facts not set out in an information
or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the
offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a
written motion for a bill of particulars. The
motion shall be filed at arraignment or within
ten days thereafter, or at such later time as
the court may permit. The court may, on its
own motion, direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. A bill of particulars may be
amended or supplemented at any time subject to
such conditions as justice, may require. The
request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement of
factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense
charged.

Emphasis added.
The Information, which forms the basis of this

prosecution, alleges in relevant part:
The undersigned, David L. Clark, under oath,
states on information and belief that the
defendant, on or about 03/04/98 [amended by
interlineation to: 2/27/98] , at the vicinity
of 3 6 00 SOUTH CONSTITUTION BLVD, West Valley
City, Utah, did unlawfully commit the
crimes(s) of:
COUNT l: Attempted Theft. 76-6-404 (Class C) ,
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. A person commits
theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a
purpose to deprive him thereof. 76-6-412.
Theft - Classification. (1) Theft of property
and services shall be punishable as follows:
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen is less than $300.
COUNT 2: Theft by Deception. 76-6-405(Class
B) , U.C.A. 1953, as amended. (1) A person
commits theft if he obtains or exercises
control over property of another by deception
and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 766-412. Theft - Classification. (1) Theft of
property and services shall be punishable: (d)
as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen is less than $300.
[RECORD at 2. See also ADDENDUM #1, hereto.]
The Court will, at the outset, note that the
Information suffers from the following shortcomings:
1. The Information DOES NOT IDENTIFY the
specific property alleged to have been stolen
"by deception" and/or "attempted" to have been
stolen outright.
2. The Information DOES NOT IDENTIFY the
specific owner (victim) of the property.
3. The Information DOES NOT IDENTIFY the
specific acts of "deception".
4. The Information DOES NOT ALLEGE the
standard allegations (i.e. "acting with the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the

commission of the offense, [the defendant]
engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense")
necessary to allege the "attempted theft"
charge.
5. The Information DOES ALLEGE, facially,
that BOTH charged crimes occurred on the same
date and at the same time. [This information,
together with the statements contained within
the "Probable Cause Statement", should have
alerted the trial court judge that both
incidents were a "single criminal episode",
for which the ramifications for the Defendant
and for the Court would prove to be
significant.]
The Information merely recited the text of the
statutes; such a practice has been condemned by the
Utah Supreme Court. See State vs Bell, 770 P. 2d 100
(Utah Supreme Court 1988), discussed below.
On 23 July 1998 the Defendant filed a written
"REQUEST

FOR

BILL

OF

PARTICULARS",

in

which

he

specifically sought:
1. What is the specific property alleged to
have been stolen by the Defendant in Count I
of the Information filed herein?
2. What is the specific property alleged to
have been stolen by the Defendant in Count II
of the Information filed herein?
3. What is the specific allegation of
deception with which the Defendant is charged
in Count II of the Information filed herein?
[RECORD at 12. See ADDENDUM #2, herein.]
Although the "Bill of Particulars" issue was argued
and debated by the parties, no formalized "bill of
particulars" was ever provided. The trial court did not

mandate the creation or production of the "bill of
particulars" responding to the Defendant's specific
inquiry. Rather, the prosecution allowed the Defendant
"open file" access to the prosecutor's case file. The
trial

court's

failure

to

require

the

"bill

of

particulars" responses to the Defendant's specific
inquiry is significant.
In this case, the Defendant's contention is NOT
what he did. The Defendant knows exactly what he did.
The request for the bill of particulars is significant
because it forces the prosecution
offense AND

(1) to allege an

(2) to prove that offense. That didn't

happen here.
Pursuant

to the

"open files" inspection, the

Defendant and/or his trial counsel was allowed to
examine

the

"WEST VALLEY

CITY ATTORNEY

SCREENING

SHEET", referring to the incident. The two charges are
described. Opposite the two charges, as handwritten by
the prosecutor "screening" the case for prosecution,
are the similarly-handwritten descriptions of the two
items alleged to have been taken, as follows:
THEFT BY DECEPTION

phone books

ATT. THE FT

pictures

[See ADDENDUM #3.]
Indeed, this prosecutorial "theory" under which the

case was screened and tried was more-or-less consistent
with what the Defendant would have expected. [That this
is exactly
CONFIRMED

the prosecutor's
by

the

view

Plaintiff's

of

the

attorney's

case is
statement

contained in the 24 March 1999 Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Support of Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Dispostion,
pageG, as follows: "He [Decker] was charged with the
attempted theft of photographs, and with theft by
deception of telephone books."] Because the pictures
were actually NOT TAKEN, the pictures (snapshots) had
to be the subject of the "attempted theft" charge.
Similarly,

because

the

"for

free

distribution"

telephone books WERE TAKEN, those telephone books had
to be the subject of the "theft by deception" charge.
Notwithstanding those disclosures, the prosecution
was nevertheless still allowed to proceed to trial
without having identified the specific property to have
been taken, the specific owner of the property, and
without identifying the specific "deception" alleged.
In this regard, as it turns put, this "open files
disclosure"

still

works

to

the

procedural

and

substantive detriment of the Defendant who was misled
into defending on a charge that wasn't really the
charge;

that's

particulars"

is

the

very

designed

mischief
to prevent

a
and

"bill

of

had

the

Defendant's three simple questions been answered, in
writing, we perhaps would not have this problem.
Of course, there was reason to fail to allege that
the phone books were the property of West Valley City,
because they weren't: the phone books were the property
of CONSTRUCTION DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INCORPORATED, and
had been delivered

in large quantities

for "FREE

DISTRIBUTION" to members of the public. If the City had
to allege another "owner" of the property, then the
City would have had to call a representative of that
owner who would have had to testify. At that juncture
the entire case would collapse, because that outside
witness

(from

confirmed

that

Construction
the

Directors)

directories

would

have

for

"free

were

distribution". Thus, the prosecution had reason to
intentionally fail to disclose the "victim".
When the case was actually tried, Judge Boyden
not necessarily privy to the prosecutor's "screening
worksheet"
both

actually found the Defendant guilty of

offenses, but

exactly

opposite

of

what

was

charged! Thus, the Defendant was intentionally misled
into defending against charges not precisely identified
in the Information, as follows: the trial judge found
the defendant guilty of the "theft by deception" charge
as related to the photographs and the "attempted theft"

charge as related to the telephone books.
The trial court's confusion (as to the requirements
of the statute AND the evidentiary proof presented at
trial) is manifest by the comments of Judge Boyden at
the December 14th sentencing, as follows:
THE COURT: . . . As to the finding of guilty
on the two separate offenses, there were facts
presented that showed the two separate thefts
so I am also denying your motion to arrest
judgment as to the fact that one is a lesser
included offense. One was talking about the
actual removal of the photographs from a file
and in a deceptive manner put hidden in a
magazine, left there. The facts show that Mr
Decker left the office and then came back in
and took the magazines in which he had placed
the pictures and the facts show that deception
was being used to exercise unauthorized
control over those pictures. It doesn't
require that he actually leave with them. The
exercising of the unauthorized control was
what the facts found and that was the basis of
my conviction on that. So, I'm also denying it
on that matter.
TRANSCRIPT OF 14 December 1998 SENTENCING HEARING, page
8. RECORD at 71.] Emphasis added. The Court later
commented:
THE COURT: My finding is that the exercise of
control, unauthorized control over the
pictures, and then hiding tjie pictures is the
deception that was used and the theft is the
exercised [sic] of unauthorized control over
those pictures by hiding them in the book and
that is the deception. So, my finding is that
the elements of theft by deception in that he
hid the property after exercising unauthorized
control over those was my finding and that's
the distinction. Both of those I think now are
on the record and will be the basis for any
appellate issues.

TRANSCRIPT OF 14 DECEMBER 1998 SENTENCING, pages 11-12.
Record at 71] Emphasis added.
That the trial court had this so mixed up indicates
the problems with proceeding without the "bill of
particulars" which was so consistently

sought and

pleaded for.
The telephone books were "free" for the asking.
They were publicly displayed. They were "given away" by
city employees. TRANSCRIPT, page 68, lines 12-14.
The prosecution's failure to provide a bill of
particulars is significant. Not only did the Defendant
not know the specific conduct he was charged with, but
the Judge was also confused, as evidenced by her
expressed comments at the December 14th sentencing, as
shown by the Transcript thereof.
The Information filed against the Defendant merely
recited the brief text of the statute itself. There was
no attempt made to "personalize" the offense or conform
the charge to the accused's actual conduct. [On the
"attempted theft" charge, the charge does NOT quote
from the statute pertaining to "attempt", but merely
recites the straight-up "theft" provision, as though
the

offense

were

completely

consummated!]

The

Information contains no description of the property
over which "unauthorized control" was exercised; this

defect has had severe adverse results upon the accused.
The trial judge actually found him guilty of the
offense opposite to what the prosecutor had charged
(and ostensibly was seeking to prove): the Defendant
was found guilty of both offenses: "theft by deception"
of the photos, even those photographs were not taken
from the premises! Thus, the "attempted theft" charge
must have applied to the telephone books, which
arguably

the evidence circumstantially showed were

taken from the premises! This incongruous result was
certainly not anticipated; a better-pleaded Information
(or the requested bill of particulars) would have had
a different result!
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of State vs Bell, 770 P. 2d 100 (Utah Supreme Court
1988) is so precisely on point in the instant situation
that detailed scrutiny of the case and its holding are
warranted.

In Bell

conviction
trafficking.

of

the defendant

racketeering

by

appealed
means

from a

of

drug

The defendant asserted that he was not

given sufficiently

detailed notice of the charges

against him to enable him to prepare a defense.

The

Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded
for a new trial.
In Bell the Utah Supreme Court wrote:

Bell argues that the inadequate notice
given on this point prejudiced his ability to
prepare a defense, thus denying him the right
to notice guaranteed by the Utah Constitution
and by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.
The State argues that Bell was put on
notice of the factual basis for the enterprise
allegations by various documents, other than
the indictment and the bill of particulars,
and by information presented during various
pretrial hearings.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution
guarantees,
"In
criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right
. . . to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him [and] to have a copy
thereof." Utah Const, art I, §12. In State v.
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert,
denied, U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed. 2d
864 (1988) , we explained that this provision
requires 'that the accused be given sufficient
information is so that he (or she) can know
the particulars of the alleged wrongful
conduct and can adequately prepare his [or
her) defense.'" Id. at 1214 (quoting State v.
Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985)); see
also State v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 107, 108, 378
P.2d 352, 353 (1963); State v. Myers, 5 Utah
2d 365, 372, 302 P.2d 276, 280 (1956).
Fulton
also
explained
that
this
constitutional right to notice is normally
implemented through Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 4, which governs, inter alia, the
contents of information, indictments, and
bills of particulars. See 742 P.2d at 1214;
Utah R. Crim. P. 4 (codified at Utah Code
Ann. §77-35-4 (1982)). Rule 4 (b)6 provides
for the commencement of a criminal action by
filing an information or indictment. Although
an information may be accompanied by a fact
statement
detailing
the
prosecution's
contentions in support of the charges, an
information
or
indictment
is
legally
sufficient even if it consists of nothing more
than an extremely summary statement of the
charge that would not provide the accused with
sufficient particulars to prepare an adequate
defense. Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1214; Utah R.
Crim.
P. 4(b).
When an indictment or
information legally sufficient under rule 4 (b)

does not provide the notice guaranteed by
article I, section 12, the accused may request
a bill of particulars under rule 4(e). Once
such a request is made, the accused is
entitled to receive, and the State has the
burden of providing, a written bill of
particulars which, in conjunction with the
indictment or information, gives notice of the
particulars of the charges in sufficient
factual detail to enable the accused to
prepare an adequate defense. Fulton, 742 P. 2d
at 1214; State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773
(Utah 1985); Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e).
770 P.2d at 103-104. Emphasis added. Citations to
footnotes omitted.
In Bell the Supreme Court was critical of the
indictment which "merely repeated verbatim the broad,
vague language of the RICE statute without describing
any facts or circumstances

constituting

the crime

charged other than a statement that the crime had been
committed". Id at 104. In Bell, the Supreme Court
concluded:
This indictment met the minimal standards
of rule 4(b), see Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1208,
but by no stretch of the imagination did it
provide Bell with sufficient notice of the
facts underlying the charges to enable him to
prepare an adequate defense.
Id. at 104-105. Emphasis added. Text contained in
footnote omitted. The Court continued:
The next question is whether Bell
exercised his right to seek more particular
notice by requesting a bill of particulars
under rule 4(e) and, thus, preserved his claim
of error. Bell did submit a timely request
that the State provide a bill of particulars
describing the factual basis for the element
of racketeering activity and specifically

explaining 'what enterprise is alleged as
being involved." Therefore, under rule 4(e),
the State had the burden of providing an
adequate bill of particulars.
The final question is whether the State
met that burden. The answer is that it did
not. At first, the State ignored Bell's
request.
Bell then secured a court order
directing that the bill be provided.
•

• •

. . .
Under
rule
4(e), a bill
of
particulars must contain sufficient "factual
information . . . to set forth the essential
elements of the particular offense charged."
The ultimate test of the adequacy of such a
statement, as noted above, is that the accused
be enabled to prepare a defense.
The record shows that at trial, the State
presented three theories as to who or what
factually constituted the enterprise: Bell as
an individual, the group of persons associated
with Molly Kingston, or Bell's convenience
store. By no stretch of the imagination could
the single enigmatic sentence in paragraph 3
of the State's reply to Bell's request be
construed as containing sufficient factual
information to describe the State's actual
theories of this essential element of the
crime, much less to permit Bell to prepare his
defense on this element.11 Although Bell
persistently objected to the inadequacy of the
bill of particulars, the State refused to
amend or supplement the bill as it would have
been permitted to do under rule 4(e). The
State failed to meet the burden of notice
imposed on it by rule 4(e), and the trial
court's failure to enforce this requirement
was clearly error under the plain language of
rule 4 (e) , as well as the standards described
in Fulton.
The Supreme Court in Bell found the error
to be prejudicial, as analyzed under Rule 3 0
standards. The Bell court wrote:
Under rule 30, an error in a criminal
prosecution requires reversal when we conclude
that, absent the error, there was a reasonable
likelihood of a result more favorable to the

accused.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,
919-21 (Utah 1987). Phrased differently, the
test is whether our confidence in the outcome
of the trial is eroded. Id. at 920. Applying
the erosion of confidence test to a failure to
give adequate notice of charges, we first ask
how the error impeded the accused's ability to
prepare for trial and to meet the State's
case. At trial, the State presented three
alternative theories as to what constituted
the essential element of an enterprise. The
specific question, then, is whether the
State's failure to notify Bell of these three
factual bases for the allegations of a RICE
enterprise so impeded his ability to prepare
a defense to those allegations as to require
a reversal under rule 30.
Ordinarily, the practical effect of the
standard imposed by rule 3 0 is to place on the
accused the burden of persuading this Court
that, in light of all the circumstances
revealed through the record as a whole, there
is a reasonable likelihood that the trial
result would have been more favorable absent
the error. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 919-21;
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah
1982) ; State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 239,
419 P.2d 770, 773 (1966).
However, as we
stated in Knight, in some circumstances the
nature of the error involved is such that this
de facto burden should be shifted and the
State required to persuade us that the error
was harmless. 734 P.2d at 920-21. In Knight,
the prosecution violated the rules of
discovery by failing to provide the accused
with certain evidence prior to trial.
We
first found that because of the nature of the
error, it was difficult for this Court to
determine from the record whether Knight might
have been able to prepare a better defense and
achieve a more favorable result at trial if
the prosecution had not breached its discovery
obligations. Id. at 920. We then held that
under such circumstances, if the accused could
make a credible argument that the prosecutor's
errors impaired the defense, it would be
appropriate "to place the burden on the State
to persuade a court that the error did not
unfairly prejudice the defense. " Id. at 920-21.
We are faced with analogous circumstances

in this case. First, as in Knight, the record
"cannot reveal how [adequate notice of the
charges] would have affected the actions of
defense counsel, either in preparing for trial
or in presenting the case to the jury." Id. at
920. Second, Bell has met the requirement of
making ma credible argument
that the
prosecutor's
errors
have
impaired
the
defense." Id. at 921.
In Knight, we noted that in assessing
whether
the
defendants
argument
of
prejudicial impairment rang sufficiently true
to warrant shifting the burden of persuasion
to the State, we would take into account the
centrality of the matter affected by the
prosecutors errors. Id. In this case, the
error involved an essential element of
the-crime charged. Clearly Bell's defense to
the State's case on the element of an
enterprise was central to the outcome, and
therefore, the error "assumes heightened
importance when evaluating whether the defense
might have been impaired." Id. Bell contends
that the prosecution's failure to sufficiently
notify him of the factual basis for its
allegations left him unable to make pretrial
preparation for a defense or to counter the
State's evidence and arguments at trial.
Given the plausibility of this contention and
the critical nature of the issue involved, we
conclude that Bell has made a credible
argument that his defense was impaired by the
error.
Under Knight, then, we place on the State
the burden of persuading us that the error was
harmless under the standard of rule 30. The
State makes only one argument in attempting to
meet this burden. It argues that Bell was not
prejudiced because he was effectively put on
notice of the State's various theories of what
constituted the element of an enterprise
through the course of certain pretrial
proceedings. The State refers to a complaint
filed in a separate proceeding seeking
forfeiture of Bell's convenience store,13 to
an in-court discussion at a hearing on that
forfeiture complaint, and to materials
provided to Bell through pretrial discovery,
including transcripts of grand jury witnesses'
testimony and transcripts of telephone

conversations recorded pursuant to a wiretap
order. The State argues that through reading
the indictment and bill of particulars in the
context of these other sources of information,
Bell must have gotten adequate notice of the
charges.
This argument fails. Our review of the
record leaves us unconvinced that Bell did in
fact receive adequate notice through these
convoluted means. None of the sources pointed
to by the State explicitly laid out the three
enterprise theories later presented at trial.
Nor do we think that the three allegations are
necessarily implicit in these sources of
information, even when they are taken as a
whole. Thus, the State has failed to meet its
burden.
Also, we think it important to clarify
that we reject the implication of the State's
argument: that the State, having failed to
provide even a minimally adequate bill of
particulars despite persistent requests from
Bell, can excuse that failure under the guise
of harmless error by claiming that Bell had
pretrial access to a mass of various items of
information from which, one can conclude in
hindsight, Bell could have gleaned the State's
theories for the essential elements of the
crimes charged. For this Court to accept such
an argument would not only vitiate the
specific requirements of rule 4 (e), it would
negate the accused's constitutional right,
implemented by rule 4(e), to "have a copy" of
a document setting out in clear terms "the
nature and cause of the accusation." Utah
Const, art. I, § 12; State v. Fulton, 742
P. 2d at 1214. A defendant, having complied
with the procedural requirements of rule 4 (e)
in requesting a bill of particulars, ought not
to have to look beyond the indictment or
information and the bill of particulars to
obtain sufficient notice of the specific
allegations to be faced at trial.
The State has not met its Knight burden
of persuading this Court that the failure to
provide an adequate bill of particulars did
not unfairly prejudice Bell's ability to
prepare and present a defense. Therefore, we
reverse Bell's conviction and remand for a new
trial with instructions that Bell be given an

adequate bill of particulars.
Emphasis added. 770 P. 2d at 105-107. Emphasis added.
Text contained in footnotes omitted.
The analysis and holding of Bell are dispositive
of the case at bar. The prosecution chose the ambiguous
wording of the Information. When requested for a bill
of

particulars

asking

three

simple

things,

the

Plaintiff's attorney's "stonewalled" the Defendant by
refusing to provide the written "bill of particulars",
specifically responding to his three cogent questions.
The trial court's involvement did not make things
better; ultimately, the prosecution provided for the
"open files", but that only misled the Defendant and
his counsel, because the court found the Defendant
"guilty" of the exact opposite charges the prosecutors
thought they had charged.
The

Court

of

Appeals

should

reverse

the

convictions, order the creation and service of a bill
of particulars, and remand the case for a jury trial.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT
HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY WHEN A WRITTEN
DEMAND THEREFOR WAS TIMELY FILED AND SERVED
In the year 1215 at Runnymede, in Surrey near
London, England, King John signed and sealed the Magna
Carta Libertatum

the Great Charter of Liberties

to

establish the rule of law within the realm. For almost
eight centuries the Magna Carta has been one of the
major cornerstones within Anglo-American jurisprudence .
Central to the Magna Carta's numerous provisions
was

the

concept

that

an accused person would be

entitled to the "judgment of one's peers1'! The "right"
to a jury trial was thus guaranteed! That "judgment of
one's

peers"

determining

was

not

merely

punishment

for

after

the

purpose

conviction,

of
but

determining the accused's guilt or innocence in the
first instance!
The trial court's denial of the timely-requested
"jury

trial"

deprived

the

Defendant

of

his

constitutional rights.
Although there are "federal" court cases holding
that a jury trial is not mandated by the federal
constitution for trials involving "petty offenses",
see, e.g. Lewis vs United States, 518 US 322, 116 SCt
2163 (1996) , Blanton vs City of North Las Vegas, 489 US
538, 109 SCt 1289 (1989), and Duncan vs Louisiana, 391
Utah 145 (1968) , the specifics of the charges filed
against the Defendant puts the "federal" standard in a
different

light. We have, in this case, a SINGLE

INCIDENT OF CONDUCT, consisting of at-the-most perhaps
five minutes of activity, over a geographic "range"

measured in a few feet (limited to a single room), by
a singular person acting alone. It is, as defined by
Utah statute, as "a single-criminal episode", for which
that

statute

PRECLUDES

multiple

punishments.

Nevertheless, the prosecution has alleged and the trial
court has accepted prosecution of TWO offenses ["theft"
(by deception) and "attempted theft"] , even though the
statute affirmatively and unambiguously commands such
should not be done! The consolidated result is to
charge, effectively,

"one" offense, for which the

maximum prescribed penalty is 9 months' incarceration--above the "threshold" for a "petty offense".
The "jury trial" had been scheduled from the date
of August 19th, as indicated by the computerized court
records. [See ADDENDUM #4] . [The court's scheduling of
the "jury trial" appears to have been a concession to
the Defendant's "oral" request, to be followed up with
by the "written demand". That written demand was filed
with the Court on September 8th. See RECORD at 18. See
ADDENDUM #3.] Even on the morning of trial, the Court's
"daily docket" posted on the bulletin board outside the
courtroom shows the case is scheduled for "jury trial".
Defendant had obtained replacement legal counsel in
anticipation of a "jury trial".
Then, on the morning of trial, because the Court

had NOT called the jury as demanded some two months
before, is unconscionable! Although there had been
considerable involvement with the Court and with the
prosecutor in the two months immediately before the
trial, neither the prosecutor nor the Court gave even
a hint that the "jury trial" would not be granted!
The self-described "policy" [SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT
at Page 7, line 12. RECORD at 71.] of the West Valley
Department of the Third District Court to require
"confirmation" of the jury demand, even after the
written demand has been submitted, or else the jury
will not be called, cannot be condoned or construed to
be valid? The statute and the rules don't require such;
the Rules merely require a "written demand", filed ten
days before trial. To allow the Court to ignore the
Defendant's timely-filed demand, merely because the
Court has not called the jury, is unconscionable. It
should not be condoned.
The Record is silent why this case proceeded to
trial, sans jury, when the other two cases
which is a "Class A" misdemeanor prosecution

one of
were

similarly scheduled for "jury trial" that morning, at
the same time.
The undersigned counsel is aware of this Court's
holding in the case of West Valley City vs McDonald,

948 P.2d 371 (Utah Court of Appeals 1997), with regard
to the right to trial by jury. The holding in McDonald
is misguided and unfortunate. First, McDonald involved
a traffic

offense

(i.e. speeding),

charged

as an

infraction! By statute, there is no right to trial by
jury in an "infraction" case. Thus, that is all that
should have been said. All of the language of McDonald
opinion

concerning

"petty

offenses"

and

the

"constitutional right" is merely obiter dicta. It is
unfortunate that the Court of Appeals would involve
itself with "constitutional" adjudication

arguably

applicable

now

criminal

defendants

when the defendant in McDonald was merely

charged

with

a

to

$50

the

full-range

"infraction".

The

of

significant

jurisprudential principles behind McDonald should be
re-examined! The McDonald "holding" (sic) should be
reversed!
Although McDonald holds there is no constitutional
right to a jury trial in "petty offenses" (for which
the charged offense is less than 6 months' possible
incarceration), the trial court's EXPRESS GRANTING of
the jury trial demand (on August 2 0th, as evidenced by
the Court's own computerized minutes) and the trial
court's view of the two charged offenses

which should

have precluded the "attempt" conviction, are such as to

override the McDonald prescription.
The Defendant timely requested a "jury trial". The
trial court even scheduled the case for "jury trial".
The Defendant hired replacement counsel to assist him
at the jury trial. Merely because the trial court
neglects (or refuses) to then call the jury cannot be
grounds to deny the Defendant his constitutional right!
Such arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of
the trial court judge cannot be condoned!
Ill
"SINGLE-CRIMINAL EPISODE" PROVISIONS PRECLUDE
CONVICTION OF BOTH OFFENSES
The trial judge found the Defendant "guilty" of
BOTH ambiguously-charged offenses, arising out of the
same action, occurring at the same time and in the same
geographical vicinity, and
theory of the case

given the prosecution's

against the same victim!

The announced "guilty" findings (verdicts) on BOTH
the "attempted theft" and the "theft by deception"
charge contradict the provisions of Section 76-1-402,
Utah Code. Given the prosecution's characterization of
the meaning of the "single criminal episode" statute,
a person
only

intending to steal Item #A AND Item #B, but

actually

nevertheless

succeeding
be

stealing

additionally

Item

punished

#A

could

(under

the

"attempt" statute) for conduct not actually consummated

(because Item #B was NOT stolen) ! This incongruity was
expressly proscribed by the Legislature.
"Attempted theft" is a lesser included offense of
the offense of "theft", which offense is
76-6-403, Utah Code

per Section

a "single offense embracing the

separate offenses" of historically-distinct offenses.
"Theft" is "theft", regardless of the manner in which
it was conducted, as said conduct is described by
statute, including the "theft by deception" charge
under

Section

76-6-405.

The

Defendant

cannot

be

punished (with a sentence for two convictions), when in
fact there should be a single conviction of a single
offense, arising out of what was, in legal terms not
admitted by the Defendant, a "single criminal episode"!
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing
party, the evidence shows the Defendant took the phone
books. That he was successful in one aspect of a theft
does not allow a second charge of "attempted theft" to
be added (for enhanced sentencing purposes), so that
the Defendant can be convicted of both offenses. Per
Section 76-1-402(3), Utah Code, the Defendant may be
convicted ONLY of the basic "theft" offense.
Thus, before the Court
trial

at the conclusion of the

was conceptually but a single charge: "theft by

deception" . Was that offense proven beyond a reasonable

doubt? No. There was no deception. The City's witnesses
acknowledged that they voluntarily surrendered to him
temporary custody of the photographs.
The

theft

of

the

photographs

was

physically

prevented by the City's witnesses: those officials
removed the photographs, thus preventing the theft.
Thus,

there

could

be

no

deception, or otherwise),

effective

"theft"

there could be

(by

only an

"attempted theft" of the photographs.
Obviously, the evidence was confusing at best and,
at worst, certainly not "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt". The trial judge was confused as to the status
of the proof, as evidenced by her subsequent comments.
At the Sentencing Hearing on December 14th, it was
apparent from the comments of Judge Boyden that she
believed that the "theft by deception" charge pertained
to the photographs.

[See "SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT at

pages 8 and 11] . And yet the photographs were not
actually taken; the "photos" could only pertain to the
"attempt" charge. Thus, the telephone books were the
basis for the "theft by deception" charge. Yet there
was no deception.
The trial judge actually found directly opposite:
in the Judge's mind, the "theft by deception" charge
pertained to the photographs. Thus, by implication, the

"attempted theft" charge had to relate to the telephone
books.
Obviously,

that's

inappropriate

because

the

"attempted theft" was for the photos. The telephone
books WERE, in fact, taken out the door and were not
recovered. [Although technically the prosecution may,
theoretically, "undercharge" an offense, that is not
what happened

here. The

"photos" were

to be the

"attempt" (because the City officials' physical removal
of the photos from the telephone books precluded there
actual removal. The prosecutors thought (and have so
stated to this Court) that the "theft by deception"
pertained to the telephone books!]
Mr Decker was "guilty" of ONLY an "attempt". The
"deception" found by the trial judge is now what the
statute requires.
The announced "guilty" finding (verdict) on the
"attempted theft" and the "theft by deception" charge
contradicts the provisions of Section 76-1-402, Utah
Code. "Attempted theft" is a lesser included offense of
the offense of "theft", which offense is
76-6-403, Utah Code

per Section

a "single offense embracing the

separate offenses" of historically-distinct offenses.
"Theft" is "theft", regardless of the manner in which
it was conducted, as said conduct is described by

statute, including the "theft by deception" charge
under

Section

76-6-405.

The

Defendant

cannot

be

punished (with a sentence for two convictions), when in
fact there should be a single conviction of a single
offense, arising out of what was, in legal terms not
admitted by the Defendant, a "single criminal episode"!
Section

76-1-402(3),

Utah

Code,

provides

in

relevant part:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged, but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
•

• •

(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense
charged or an offense otherwise
included therein;
In the instant proceeding, the City charged two
offenses:

The

1.

Theft by deception AND

2.

Attempted theft.

"facts"

incident
prevailing

surrounding

the

alleged

"theft"

viewed in a light most favorable to the
party

(the

City)

is

basically

the

following:
The Defendant attempted to hide the
photographs AND the Defendant left the
premises with the telephone books in hand.
The actions of the Defendant were but one "single

criminal episode".

[This particular theory of the

commission of the alleged offenses has to be the
prosecutions view thereof; otherwise the case falls
apart: there is no "substantial preparation" and the
City

loses

the

"theft

by

deception".

While

the

Defendant hesitates to utilize the terminology "single
criminal episode", because such terminology is implies
criminality to his conduct, the statute utilizes that
term. The term

is utilized herein

for analytical

purposes.] Viewed in a light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the evidence shows the Defendant took
the phone books. That he was successful in one aspect
of a theft does not allow a second charge of "attempted
theft" to be added (for enhanced sentencing purposes),
so

that

the

Defendant

can

be

convicted

of

both

offenses. Per Section 76-1-402(3), Utah Code, the
Defendant may be convicted only of the initial offense.
Mr Decker was "guilty" of only an "attempt"
That the trial court had this so mixed up indicates
the problems with proceeding without the "bill of
particulars" which was so consistently

sought and

pleaded for.
IV
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT
The witnesses for the prosecution testified they
observed the Defendant place the two photographs inside

(or between) the telephone books; he, on the other
hand, testified that the papers and photographs from
the City's file were spread over the table, and that if
the photographs were inadvertently intermingled with
the

telephone

books,

such

was

not

indicative

of

criminal behavior, but merely innocent inadvertence and
neglect. In this context, the Prosecution has not
alleged

or proven

that the Defendant, "acting with

the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission

of

the

offense,

engages

in

conduct

constituting a substantial step toward commission of
the offense", as required by Section 76-4-101(1), Utah
Code. Furthermore, Section 76-4-101(2) is even more
demanding, by stating:
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does
not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actors intent to
commit the offense.
Emphasis added. With regard to the photographs, the is
no

evidence

of

"strongly

corroborative"

evidence

showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, a "substantial step
towards commission of the offense" by the Defendant
"acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required
for the commission of the offense", as the statute
requires.
Under the prosecution's "theory"
understood

or

followed

by

the

obviously not

trial

judge

the

placement of the photographs within or between the two
telephone books might have been "a substantial step",
except for the fact that the telephone books were
"free", for "free distribution" to the public. The
prosecution cannot "bootstrap" itself in a "theory" (of
guilt) by showing the placement of the pictures between
the telephone books, and then ignore the implications
of the status of those telephone books: i.e. that it
was essential that the telephone books be "free" for
taking, or else how would the Defendant have "by
deception" effected the theft. Without the telephone
books being "free" for the taking, the other conduct
(i.e. misplacing the photographs) has no "criminal"
significance. The telephone books had to be "free", so
as to enable the Defendant to take them from the room
without suspicion. That being the case, the prosecution
cannot advance a conflicting theory which says those
telephone books were "the property of West Valley City"
[which they weren't].
The telephone books had been delivered at the City,
for subsequent "free" distribution to members of the
public. The two telephone books which were placed in
the "code enforcement" office of West Valley were not--as the Plaintiff's attorney has stated [page
The telephone books were "free" for the taking, by

citizens. They were publicly displayed.
Section 76-6-401, Utah Code, providing for certain
"definitions" pertinent to "theft" offense, provides in
relevant part:
(5) "Deception"

occurs

when

a

person

intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or
conduct an impression of law or fact
that is false and that the actor
does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false
impression of law or fact that the
actor
previously
created
or
confirmed by words or conduct that
is likely to affect the judgment of
another and that the actor does not
now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring
information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or
encumbers
property
without
disclosing
a
lien,
security
interest, adverse claim, or other
legal impediment to the enjoyment of
the property, whether the lien,
security
interest,
claim,
or
impediment is or is not valid or is
or is not a matter of official
record; or
(e) Promises performance that is
likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which
performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows that will
not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise
in issue without other evidence of
intent
or
knowledge
is
not
sufficient proof that the actor does
not intend to perform or knew the
promise would not be performed.

Section 76-6-405, Utah Code, defining and describing
the actual substantive offense of "theft by deception",
provides:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive
ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of
wares or worth in communications addressed to
the public or to a class or group.
Emphasis added. Two observations are in order. First,
it is apparent that "theft by deception" presupposes an
almost "economic" status to the transaction (i.e. an
"economic"

or

"financial"

component

to

the basic

transaction, as evidenced by either the exchange of
actual

economic

equivalent

value

i.e.

money

or

economic

or by the expectation to receive economic

value as a result of the transaction) , or, (2) in cases
where

the

actual

property

so

transferred

has

recognizable "economic" or monetary value. Neither is
present in the instant case.
That City officials surrendered to the Defendant
the files and allowed him to inspect the same is not
"theft by deception". It was his absolute statutory
right to inspect such public records. See, for example,
Section 10-3-603 and Section 63-2-201, Utah Code. There

was NO "deception" in obtaining those files, for public
inspection, when such files were contained with the
City Hall and for which the Defendant later left to pay
the City Treasurer for copies of the very records he
had inspected.

[His payment for those copies also

negates any mens rea required for "theft".]
It is also noteworthy that whereas the Information
charging the Defendant with the two offense recites
what appears to be the statutory text for the offense,
omits subparagraph (2) which specifies when theft by
deception does NOT occur.
Assuming,
proscribed

for the sake of argument, that the

conduct was that

"Mr Decker

implicitly

promised to return all the 'public records' documents
surrendered to him", that conduct does not facially
contain the required "deception", because there was
"only

falsity

as

to matters

having

no

pecuniary

significance"! As Ms Gleed described, his getting the
photographs mixed up with the other documents on the
table

which

has

an

innocent) explanation

otherwise

explainable

(and

is not probative, particularly

"beyond a reasonable doubt", of the Defendant's guilt
of "theft by deception".
Utah law requires that there be "reliance" in
"theft by deception" cases. In State vs Jones, 657 P. 2d

1263 (Utah Supreme Court 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
wrote:
It is clear from the face of the statute
that reliance by the victim is an element of
the crime of theft by deception. In context,
obtaining property "by deception" can only
mean "by means of deception." Deception,
followed by transfer of property to the
deceiver, does not add up to theft by
deception without the causal element of
reliance. Even though the alleged victim is
deceived, if he does not rely on the deception
in parting with his property, there has been
no theft "by deception". State v. Vatsis, 10
Utah 2d 244, 246-47. 351 P.2d 96, 97-98 (1960)
(involving statutory predecessor of §76-6405(1), which also contained no express
reference to "reliance")/ State v. Finch, 223
Kan. 398, 573 P.2d 1048 (1978).
657 P.2d at 1267. Emphasis added.
Ms Candace Gleed

the West Valley City employee

who had surrendered temporary custody of the "case
file" to Mr Decker for him to inspect the same
affirmatively testified THERE WAS NO DECEPTION on her
part associated with Mr Decker's receiving the "file"
containing the photographs. Ms Gleed testified:
Q (by Mr BRADFORD [Defense Counsel]): Well,
whatever he did, he didn't deceive you, did
he?
A (by Ms GLEED): I believe he did.
Q: How?
A:
In that he was putting those photographs
in between the directories while I was
standing right there, in an attempt to take
them.
Q: That didn't deceive you. You saw what he
did.
A: Yeah, he didn't know that I saw it.
Q: Sure. So, he didn't deceive you. You
watched him.

A: He tried to.
Q: Well, but he didn't.
A: No, he didn't.
Mr BRADFORD: Thank you.
TRANSCRIPT at Page 86, lines 12 thru 25. RECORD at 70.
Emphasis added.
When the prosecution's own witness testifies that
there was "no deception", the trial court's finding is
not supported by the evidence. The conviction cannot
stand!
CONCLUSION
The Defendant has been unfairly prejudiced by the
prosecutions repeated failure to provide the "bill of
particulars", specifically describing the items of
property alleged to have been stolen or attempted to
have

been

Defendant

stolen.

This

failure

resulted

in

the

misled by the "open file" disclosure as to

the prosecutor's theory

defending against charges

exactly opposite of what the trial court judge found
him guilty of! This judicial result could not have
happened, were the trial court judge to have been
informed as to what the prosecutor was attempting to
prove.
The trial court's refusal to grant the timelydemanded "jury trial", for these serious misdemeanor
offenses, is unjustified. The Rules do not require the
Defendant

to

"reconfirm"

his

"demand".

The

trial

court's failure to properly convene the jury

when the

"jury trial" had been so scheduled for months

did

deprive the defendant of his rights.
The "dual" convictions (i.e. of both offenses) is
clearly precluded by the "single criminal episode"
statute. Furthermore, the status of the confusing
evidence is such that the trial court's own findings
evidence

the

prosecution's

failure

to

prove

the

accused's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt".
The prosecution has, in this case, the burden of
showing that the failure to provide the requested bill
of particulars was not "harmless" error.
The verdict is not supported by the evidence.
During the trial there was introduced no evidence
"strongly corroborative" of the accused mental state as
to when he was handling the photographs. Furthermore,
the telephone books were "for free" distribution. The
Defendant's taking of the books cannot be the basis of
a criminal conviction.
The Defendant's conviction of both offenses should
be set aside. The case should be remanded to the
District

Court

for

a

jury

trial,

following

the

providing of a "bill of particulars" identifying the
property in question. In the alternative, the charges
should be dismissed, outright, as the prosecution

simply failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 1999.

Attorney for Appellant
JAMES WESTON DECKER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be mailed, first-class postage
prepaid, to Mr Elliot R Lawrence, Attorney at Law,
Office of the West Valley City Attorney, 3600 South
Constitution Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah 84119,
this 12th day of July, 1999
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Keith L. Stonev (3868)
David L.Clark(6199)
John W.Huber (7226)
West Valley City Prosecutors
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, Utah 841 \{)
(801)963-3331
IN THE THIRD DISI nu r C O U R T , s i \ n ; O F UTAH
SALTLAkL< O' V* Y. wr.s'l VALLLY Dl-rAKTMMM'

STATE OF UTAH (West Valley < ">«> >
Plaintiff,

!\H)lOl\Tlt)\

v.

Conn No.

' 1 ^ 1 \ \;.\ r\r:- r^

JAMES WESTON DECKER
3247 WEST 3650 SOUTH
WEST VALLEY CITY U I SI j I o
10/02/50
Defendant.

The undersigned, David L.Clark, inula- <>;i»h, states on information and belief Ilia! the
defendant, on or about 69/W7W, ill ihc\icmit\ of 3M)0 SOUTH r o w i T n T f O N iMA'V West
Valley City, Utah, did unlawfully commit tin; ciimc(s) of:
COUNT 1: Attempted Theft. 76-6-404 << bss < ). r.c.A. 1'*5.\ as :nnnMlni.
A person commits theft if he obtains o? evrrises nnautho» i/< ^ rontna <w <<?• MM p ^ p r r h ^
another with a purpose to deprive hio» <!*""<>'.
76-6-412. Theft - Classification.
(1) Theft of property and services shall he punishable as follows:
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if (he valnc of the property stolen is less than S3^o.
COUNT 2: Theft by Deception. 7"~'»~M5 fCkiss Po. U.C.A. U^3, as ame<ole<k
(1) A person commits theft if he nj>f;>i»»s m «>\r»-rises control <o IT p» nn- r^ of :nM»f her fn ('r^piion
and with a purpose to deprive him thcrmk
76-6-412. Theft - Classification.
(1) Theft of property and services shall !>«• punishable:
(d) as a class B misdemeanor U ihv value <>! the property stolen is »<>ss than S3tM>.

Hi is information is based on fhe evidence obtained from (he follow me, witnesses:
MIKEL BIRCH

\.w^

CANDACE GLEED
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant is informed by West Valley Report No. 98-1 1931 and the above named witnesses as
follows:
WITNESS STATED THAT 'I III* I >EFENDANT E\TR( ISI'D CONTROL OVER THE
PROPERTY OF WEST VALLEY ORDINANCE ENFORCEMENT BY TAKING TWO TELEPHONE
BOOKS HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO HIDE PHOTOGRAPIIS IN TIIAT BELONGED TO
ORDINANCE ENFORCEMENT; DEFENDANT WITHOUT NIL PERMISSION OF WEST VALLEY
ORDINANCE, CONCEALED PHOTOGRAPHS IN BETWEEN TWO PHONE BOOKS, AND
ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE WITH SAME.
DATED this fj.

day of

//UA

, 1998

^fe

David L. Clark

98-11931, SU, March 09, 1498
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JASON R. RAMMELL 7 287
LARSEN & RAMMELL
Attorney for Defendant
3600 South Market St., 100
West Valley City, Utah 84119,
Telephone: 964-1200
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
ooOoo
WEST VALLEY CITY,
REQUEST FOR BILL
OF PARTICULARS

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES W. DECKER,

:

Defendant.

Case No. 981101080
Judge Ann Boyden

:
ooOoo

COMES NOW James W. Decker, by and through his attorney,
Jason R. Rammell, pursuant to URCrP Rule 4 and hereby files a
Request For a bill of Particulars to assist in understanding nature
and

cause

of

the

charges

herein

and

assist

the Defendant

in

preparation of his defense as follows:
1.

What is the specific property alleged to have been

stolen by the Defendant in Count I of the Information filed herein?
2.
stolen by

What is the specific property alleged to have been

the Defendant

in Count

II of

the Information

filed

herein?
3.

What is the specific allegation of deception with

which the Defendant is charged in Count II of the Information filed
herein?

ADDENDUM 2

DATED this- -=>"^>
^

day of

V. .s

, 1998.

JASON R. RAMMELL
"Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This will certify that on the
day of
1998, a true and correct copy of Request for bill of Particulars,
was mailed, postage prepaid, *o the West Valley City Prosecutor at
3600 Constitution Blvd., West Valley City, Utah
84119
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JAMES W DECKER
Defendant Pro Se
3247 West Lancer Way
West Valley City, Utah

84119

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
WEST VALLEY CITY'DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY,
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff
vs
JAMES W DECKER,
Case No. 98-1101080
Defendant

The undersigned, as Defendant Pro Se, hereby demands that the
criminal charges in the above-entitled action be tried by jury.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of September, 1998.

JAMES W DECKER
Defendant Pro Se
CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL to be mailed to Mr David Clark, Assistant City Attorney, West
Valley City Attorney's Office, 3600'South Constitution Boulevard,
West Valley City, Utah 84119, this 8th day of September,/l998.

Off**
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DUM 4
1 PAGE

I NUMBER 981101080 Other Misdemeanor
Clerk:
sandeeb
Prosecutor: DAVID CLARK
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): L. BRUCE LARSEN
Audio
T^pe Number:

^

-..N
17636*^ Tape Count: 5890

•*k

Deft present with counsel, ncK^esolution case set for Jury Tri
Defendant stated that he will s^k own counsel. Bruce Larsen
motioned for withdrawel of cqungely motion granted
JURY TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 11/04/1998
Time: 09:00 a.m.
*
Location: SECOND FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
\
3636 SOUTH 2700 WEST
"\,
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
before Judge ANN BOYDEN
janetl
•20-98 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel-Larsen & Rammell
-08-98 Filed: Renewed Motion to Dismiss (prosecutorial Failure to
janet1
Provide Requested Bill of Particulars)-James W Decker
janetl
-08-98 Filed: Demand for Jury Trial-James W Decker
-09-98 Filed: Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Request for A Bill
carole
of Particulars
-21-98 Filed: Plaintiff's Objection To Defendant's Renewed Motion To
carole
Dismiss
-07-98 AB/cce Court orders Defendant's motion to dismiss - denied.
Because plaintiff has informed defendant of the nature and cause
of the charges against him, has reasonably provided discovery to
cindye
the defendant, & has made evidence available to defendant
-07-98 there is no basis in law or fact to dismiss case for lack of
cindye
Bill of Particulars.
cindye
-07-98 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision - J Decker
janetl
1-07-98 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision-James W Decker
1-07-98 Note: Defendant contacted clerk by phone regarding motion.
Defendant was read court's decision. Copy of case history
mailed to defendant this date,
cindye
J - 1 4 - 9 8 Filed: Motion Notice And Order For Continuance - Keith L Stoney carole
L - 0 3 - 9 8 AB/SAB deft phoned this date regarding jury, clerk told Mr,
Decker that the continuance was nat granted and a jury was not
called because of timelyness,
sandee
L - 0 3 - 9 8 Filed: Motion , notice and order for continuance
barbar
L - 0 3 - 9 8 AB/cce Def was contacted this date to determine if a resolution
had been reached on this case or if a jury still needed to be
filed, Def stated that he had relied on the city's motion which
stated that the case had been continued and was not
cindye
1-03-98 prepared to go forward. Def was informed that the city had
withdrawn the motion and the case would go forward. Def stated

iv-i«4-oH. 0 9 / 2 4 / 9 9
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BOYDEN

November U4, « :
WednescU

HD FLOOR—-

0 AM 1
JURY TRIAL
WEST VALLEY CITY
VS. DECKER, JAMES WESTON
OTN:
DOB

WVC 981101080 Other Misdemeanoi
ATTY:
ATTY: LARSEN, L. BRUCE
/02/1950

MC - THEFT
MB - THEFT BY DECEPTION
DOB

10-2-50
NO OTN NUMBER

.M3L

llLi

WVC 981100340 Other Misdemeanoi
ATTY:
ATTY:

2
JURY TRIAL
WEST VALLEY CITY
VS. MOWER, JEAN FRANCIS
MA - THEFT
DOB:

10-17-97
NO OTN NUMBER

MlMzn-.fM:lM

Ml

WVP 971003766 Other Misdemeanoi
ATTY:
ATTY:

3
JURY TRIAL
WEST VALLEY CITY
VS. PIENEZZA, JOSEPH ROBINSON
OTN: 848975
DOB: 06/25/1979

MB - SIMPLE ASSAULT
MB - CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
MB - CARRYING CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON
DOB 6 - 2 5 - 7 9

hJM±2M]L.^L3l.ll.
ADDENDUM 6
*«•%!-

4

r^c

<y

DAOC

Ml

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provides in relevant part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, . . .
Emphasis added.

ADDENDUM 7

Section 76-4-101, Utah Code
Attempt

Elements of offense

(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of
the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not
constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the
offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall
arise:
(a) because the offense
actually committed; or

attempted

was

(b) due to factual or legal impossibility
if the offense could have been committed
had the attendant circumstances been as the
actor believed them to be.

ADDENDUM 8

Section 76-1-402, Utah Code
Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode
Included offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising
out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal
episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished
in
different
ways
under
different
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable
under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision
bars prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses
under a single criminal episode, unless the court
otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a) The
offenses
are
within
jurisdiction of a single court; and

the

(b) The
offenses
are
known
to
the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant
is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the
included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It
constitutes
an
attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged
or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.

ADDENDUM 9
*

AC
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DA<^C

Section 76-6-405, Utah Code, defining and describing
the actual substantive offense of "theft by deception",
provides:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive
ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of
wares or worth in communications addressed to
the public or to a class or group.
Emphasis added.
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Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides, in
relevant part:
(b) An indictment or information shall charge
the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the
offense by common law or by statute or by
stating in concise terms the definition of the
offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. An information may
contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to
sustain the offense charged where appropriate.
Such things as time, place, means, intent,
manner, value and ownership need not be
alleged, unless necessary to charge the
offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and
judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known
or by which they be identified without setting
forth a copy. However, details concerning such
things may be obtained through a bill of
particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor
matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(e) When facts not set out in an information
or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the
offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a
written motion for a bill of particulars. The
motion shall be filed at arraignment or within
ten days thereafter, or at such later time as
the court may permit. The court may, on its
own motion, direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. A bill of particulars may be
amended or supplemented at any time subject to
such conditions as justice may require. The
request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement of
factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense
charged.

Emphasis added.
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